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ABSTRACT
This research analyzes the power of the Internet and social networks in the Arab uprisings. We are interested in
learning about the contribution of communication technology in low advanced societies in conflict situations and the
value of the network as a link between young people who supported the changes from abroad and those who were
directly involved in protests. On the importance of technology as a virtual communication tool we have conducted
a series of online interviews with 30 young people from Tunisia, Egypt and Libya living in Barcelona, Madrid and
Santiago de Compostela during the development of the conflicts and who were involved in the Arab Spring though
the network. The research findings in this study prove that virtual support for uprisings were not based on coordi-
nated actions, and that it was simply a confluence of similar acts coinciding in time and on the same platforms. The
Internet and social networks served as elements for supporting the process and as a counter-balance to official cen-
sorship and to government-supportive media, and were useful for overcoming the isolation of Arab society, in order
to make the conflicts visible and to attract relevant support from abroad. But it also showed that the network had
constraints in the face of the consolidated propaganda infrastructure which existed in each country.
RESUMEN
Esta investigación analiza el papel de Internet y de las redes sociales en las revueltas árabes. Interesa conocer la con-
tribución de la tecnología a la comunicación en sociedades poco avanzadas en situaciones de conflicto y el valor de
la Red como enlace entre los jóvenes que apoyaban los cambios desde el exterior y los que participaban directamen-
te en las manifestaciones. Para conocer la importancia de la tecnología como instrumento de comunicación virtual
se ha realizado una serie de entrevistas on-line a 30 jóvenes de Túnez, Egipto y Libia que vivían en Barcelona,
Madrid y Santiago de Compostela durante el desarrollo de los conflictos y que han participado en la primavera árabe
a través de la Red. Los resultados de esta investigación demuestran que los apoyos virtuales a las revueltas no estaban
basados en acciones coordinadas, simplemente se trataba de una confluencia de actos similares que coincidían en
el tiempo y en las mismas plataformas. Internet y las redes sociales funcionaron como elementos de apoyo al proceso
y como contrapeso a la censura oficial y a los medios afines al régimen, y fueron útiles para superar el aislamiento
de la sociedad árabe, para hacer visibles los conflictos y para conseguir apoyos relevantes en el exterior. Pero tam-
bién se demostró que la Red tenía limitaciones frente a la consolidada infraestructura de propaganda que existía en
cada país.
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1. Introduction and overview
In the spring of 2011 a series of uprisings broke out
in a number of Arab countries, causing regimes that
had been in power for decades to collapse, in some
cases with incredible speed. The first protests began in
Tunisia, but quickly spread to other key points in the
area, wasting no time in reaching Egypt and Libya
(Fernández 2011). But these political and social chan-
ges, having no contemporary precedents in the Arab
World, were not purely coincidental, but rather had
been discreetly cultivated and strengthened over the
years (Majdoubi, 2011). The only missing ingredient
was a detonator; a trigger event to force the people to
take to the streets, since all the necessary conditions for
unleashing these protests were already dormant in the
general population: significant social differences, poli-
tical corruption and abuse of power, lack of freedom,
continuous repression and restriction of basic civil
rights, and ostentatious government employee privile-
ges, etc. (Izquierdo, 2009). 
The isolation that Arab countries had traditionally
been subjected to ended when globalization and tech-
nology made official geographic boundaries obsolete
(Lago & Marotias, 2006). Then, virtual relations be -
came normalized, making it possible to contact any
corner of the globe without needing to travel (Esteinou,
2003). The unstoppable advance of the Internet and
social networks revolutionized old modes of communi-
cation and produced a massive information exchange
with the outside world (Roces, 2011). In this new sce-
nario, Arab society, especially its youth, now has the
means to avoid censorship and regime control within its
reach for the first time in history (George-Cosh, 2010),
along with the ability to organize and share opinions
with foreign communities. They also have at their dis-
posal the necessary tools to denounce their government
on a world stage, and are able to receive all kinds of
international support, from advice on topics of strategic
interest and general logistics to guarantee the success of
their protests to solidarity movements that lend visibility
and prominence to the cause. 
Officially, media in the Arab world was controlled
either by the State or the military (Warda, 2012), and
social networking through the Internet has not only
facilitated more open access to information, but also
freedom of expression and the right to express opi-
nions and to associate freely, albeit in a virtual sense. 
International communication allows one to under -
stand other realities and to compare and contrast diffe-
rent social models, and it was in this context that the
Arab youth saw the chance to demonstrate their long-
latent non-conformity and to fight for comprehensive
political reform (Majdoubi, 2011). The constant vir-
tual calls to revolution were able to draw thousands of
citizens onto the streets. The massive crowds gathered
in Tahrir Square now serve as a point of reference, an
example of the power of this proclamation (Schechter,
2011). The Internet and social networks were useful
during the initial stages of the uprisings and also later,
as the conflicts developed, because they encouraged a
close monitoring of how the events were unfolding
(Roces, 2011). In spite of the imposed censorship and
the constant information blockades, these media plat-
forms made it possible for anyone to find out what was
happening in the Arab world, which served to sensiti-
ze the international community.
The media has always been considered a strategic
weapon in any conflict, and proof of this is found in
the fact that state-sponsored television and radio sta-
tions were among the first places to be protected by
the regimes when uprisings broke out in Tunisia,
Egypt and Libya (Castillo, 2012). Because no free and
independent press existed, the information was disse-
minated to the citizens through media channels conta-
minated by government propaganda. During the pro-
tests, access to foreign media was limited, complicated
or obstructed leaving journalists to work in repressive
conditions, with no real way to corroborate their sto-
ries. The governments hid sensitive and strategic loca-
tions from journalists, keeping them from reporting
information or images about the strength of the rebel
troops or the weaknesses of the regime (Raoof, 2010).
Other times they tried to discredit international media
outlets, accusing them of bias. Journalists have been a
target in the majority of the conflicts, and in these spe-
cific uprisings, many suffered physical attacks while
attempting to get information, especially during the
actual protests. They tried to prevent access to quali-
fied witnesses of the events (Rodríguez, 1999). But the
Internet had completely changed the traditional map of
how information is spread. And in this new scenario,
efforts to maintain control over the media and the dis-
semination of information were increasingly difficult
and complex to carry out (Etling, Kelly, Faris & Pal -
frey, 2009). The most substantial difference between
the Arab Spring of 2011 and prior conflicts is that,
when protests broke out in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya,
the Internet and other social networks were already
established and consolidated in society, composing an
important alternative to traditional media and commu-
nication infrastructures. Even though it has different
characteristics and objectives, the Internet is able to
perform tasks similar to those of print media, radio or
television, sometimes even outperforming them, an
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occurrence that had up until that point not been
thought possible (De-Rivera, 2011).
Since journalists were not permitted access to all
the protests, in many cases the only images and proof
that came out of the uprisings were those found on the
Internet and social networks, obtained and distributed
by anonymous citizens who, lacking the appropriate
knowledge of professional journalism standards, were
unable to verify their data and offer objective and veri-
fied information (Gómez-Diago, 2005), a process
which is called unfiltered jour-
nalism. Because of this, a num-
ber of authors, including Can -
ga (2001), agree that the infor-
mation that circulates on the
Internet does not have the
same value or adhere to the
same quality standards as tradi-
tional media, from a journalis-
tic perspective. It was precisely
this argument that the Arab
governments favored time and
again to discredit any unfavo-
rable reports found on the
Internet. They claimed that
these reports had been taken
out of context or worse, that
they were completely untrue.
But there is another important
factor to consider: many citi-
zens attribute similar levels of
credibility to all media formats
because they do not differen-
tiate between the specific roles
that each one should have. For
these people, the images that
circulate on the Internet are documents whose very
existence supports the veracity of the events they are
supposedly documenting, and they do not question
other details that a professional would in a similar situa-
tion (González, 1989). In this context, the Internet and
social network sites had a distinct advantage over the
technical limitations and informational control that
other Arab media networks were forced to endure,
which facilitated both the reach and the impact of the
content as it spread around the Internet. 
From a theoretical standpoint, much has been
written about the role, the importance and the possibi-
lities of technology in the field of information gathering
and communication, but the phenomenon of how the
Internet and social networks were used during the
Arab uprisings also underscores the importance of
reflecting on the risks involved if these technological
tools are not used or regulated correctly. One of the
most controversial aspects is the uncontrolled dissemi-
nation of sensitive or inappropriate information on the
Internet, which can be especially dangerous for those
who do not have the necessary education to decipher
and process it. At the same time, it should not be for-
gotten that technology makes it possible to control
communication and the flow of information. The
same elements that keep information from being cen-
sored can be converted into tools of repression, just as
Arab governments did during the uprisings, blocking
Internet access to impede the free flow of information.
Another potential risk factor is that technology could
be used to create propaganda (Belaali, 2011). It has
been proven that these same governments infiltrated
the Internet to plant false information with the end
goal of sabotaging the rebels. The universe of informa-
tion technologies and communication is large enough
to allow for the coexistence of various phenomena,
from a direct and high-speed connection with the
source of information to the immediate reception of
news from any corner of the world. But this universal
access to the Internet can also lead to chaotic and
disorganized information. This is considered one of
the primary risk factors associated with the so-called
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Many citizens attribute similar levels of credibility to all
media formats because they do not differentiate between the
specific roles that each one should have. For these people,
the images that circulate on the Internet are documents
whose very existence supports the veracity of the events
they are supposedly documenting, and they do not question
other details that a professional would in a similar situation. In
this context, the Internet and social network sites had a dis-
tinct advantage over the technical limitations and informatio-
nal control that other Arab media networks were forced to
endure, which facilitated both the reach and the impact of
the content as it spread around the Internet. 
journalism without filters. Additionally, the sheer volu-
me and variety of information that circulates on the
Internet must be taken into account (Canga, 2001), a
determining factor that can complicate or even prevent
an effective management of content and affect the uti-
lity of the messages. 
2. Materials and methods
In order to understand the role of the Internet and
social networks in the Arab uprisings and to confirm
the effects and the efficacy of technology as a commu-
nication tool in underdeveloped societies that have
been subjected to repressive regimes for decades, a
series of on-line surveys were distributed to 30 young
people from Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, countries that
best represent the general characteristics and overall
scope of the 2011 Arab Spring revolutions. Ten peo-
ple from each of these three countries were inter -
viewed, each between the ages of 19 and 25 years
old, and who were either living, studying or working
in Barcelona, Madrid or Santiago de Compostela from
the time when the uprisings broke out to when the
regimes were overthrown. These young people are
representative of the user profile that dominated virtual
media formats during the uprisings, a feature which
clarifies how technology was used to participate in the
conflicts and to support the cause from abroad, along
with highlighting how the Internet and social networks
influenced how events developed, which is the pri-
mary objective of this study. The 30 interviewees
were supporters of a regime change in their respective
countries, and were all asked about the following
topics: motives for why they became involved in the
protests, strategies and types of communication used,
characteristics and changes in the content of both sent
and received messages, profiles of the people with
whom they virtually interacted
and how they perceive support
for the uprisings from an inter-
national perspective. 
The results of these inter-
views have been compared
with information about the
political and social situations in
Tunisia, Egypt and Libya
found in three Spanish media
outlets («TVE», «El País» and
«El Mundo») during the same
time period. The goal of this
comparison is to verify if gene-
ral-interest media provides a
reference point and a source of
information for users of the
Internet and other social net-
works. 
While the protests were
taking place in each of the
above-mentioned countries,
the activities of the 30 inter -
viewees were monitored by
means of a monthly on-line
survey, in order to obtain pre-
cise data that would permit a qualitative and quantita-
tive analysis of the different phases of the conflicts, and
also to know if the same level of support was main -
tained throughout the entire period or if there were fluc-
tuations in attitudes during the process. Additionally, in
the final interview, the subjects were asked to assess,
from their point of view, the role that the Internet and
social network sites played in the entire process, along
with an appraisal of the changes produced in their
countries, specifying the factors that they believe had
contributed decisively to the fall of the regimes.
The concepts and ideas used as primary reference
points for this study are as follows: usefulness of infor-
mation, design of communications strategies and plans,
joint actions, coordinated actions, and informational
and communicative opportunities originating from
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There remains the impression that the virtual support for the
Arab uprisings was based on coordinated actions, but an
analysis of the reality, as has been demonstrated in the data
from this investigation, shows that this was not the case;
there was simply a confluence of similar activity which, by
chance, coincided in time and platform. However, there
was also an important mimetic effect, emerging from the first
international declarations of solidarity, which transformed
into a massive phenomenon as a consequence of the 
summoning power of the Internet and its word-of-mouth
effect. This caused the support base to grow progressively
from the very beginning.
Internet usage during times of conflict, all while re -
membering the organizational capacity that technology
possesses to promote social cohesion, along with its
communicative properties. 
3. Analysis and results
Of the Arab youth interviewed, 92% believe that
the Internet and social networks made the protests and
conflicts in their home countries more visible to an
international audience, and support the belief that
these technologies partially made up for the informa-
tional embargoes and censorship that local media in
the region experienced. But when it came time to pro-
vide a more precise assessment of the role of techno-
logy in the protests, 45% stated that the Internet affec-
ted the development of events and the successful out-
come of each conflict, with only 32% categorizing vir-
tual media as crucial. These 32% of respondents feel
that the old regimes fell faster because the Internet
gave those living abroad a better understanding of the
significance of the abuses that were being committed
by the government, which gave rise to an international
solidarity movement with the rebel forces, contributing
to the further isolation of the regimes. For 81% of the
subjects, the sudden and generalized outbreak of the
revolts was surprising; even though they had been
aware of social unrest and were hoping that a citizen
uprising would occur, they did not expect it to be so
drastic or immediate. They assumed that any conflict
would carry on silently for years, with 56% estimating
that change would eventually arrive, but only with the
natural dissolution of the old regime. 
Amongst participants, 89% recognize the lack of a
unifying strategy that would have permitted the deve-
lopment of a joint and effective effort, and admitted
that the majority of their Internet activities were spon-
taneous, individual actions that were in response to a
general feeling of solidarity with those that were wor-
king to improve social conditions in their country.
Within this group, 75% are of the opinion that the lack
of coordination and advising was one of the most sig-
nificant problems of the entire process, and that the
overall success of the Internet and social networks
would have been much greater if there had been a
well-designed plan in place from the beginning, inste-
ad of losing out on all that the Internet has to offer by
focusing on useless information. For these young peo-
ple, a more coordinated effort would have optimized
resources, establishing filters that could have avoided
the dissemination of fraudulent information and allo-
wing for a centralized management of all communica-
tions. Directly related to this, one of the problems that
Arab activists endured on a daily basis was the recep-
tion and categorization of the extraordinary volumes of
data that flooded communication channels and the-
reby became less effective simply by being unmanage-
able. They also admit that there were certain messa-
ges that were constantly being repeated, above all
summaries of articles announcing foreign government
support for the rebels, information about solidarity
movements with the Arab Spring being celebrated in
countries around the world, and a large amount of
irrelevant data. 
But at the same time, 62% affirm that a strategy
designed with professional criteria and standards is
unrealistic because it would require adequate infras-
tructures and would involve a great deal of prior orga-
nization and preparation, all of which were not feasi-
ble at the time, due to a scarcity of resources and free
time. Moreover, 47% sustain that the lack of homoge-
neous criteria and common guidelines in the events
carried out during the Arab Spring is actually what
defines the philosophy of using the Internet and social
networks to support a cause, however chaotic and
dysfunctional it may seem. The interviewees agree
that these actions are based on solidarity, spontaneity
and individual freedom, all of which must prevail in
active and passive use of the Internet.
After analyzing the interviews, it can be deduced
that these young Arab residents of Barcelona, Madrid
and Santiago de Compostela rarely communicated
with each other or with other friends or acquaintan-
ces, except on rare occasions such as selected wee-
kends when they would meet and discuss issues that
they considered to be sensitive or important. Only 11%
admit to having consulted an expert at any given
moment. Of these, the advice being sought was almost
always in relation to possible strategies to make the
protests more effective and impactful, to find interna-
tional funding and support or to ask legal questions
about protecting friends and family members. But 38%
bemoan the fact that the recommendations that were
passed on were not always accurate because circums-
tances were constantly changing due to unforeseeable
developments in the conflicts. Furthermore, they admit
that imprudent advice has been shared on the Internet,
advice that carries the risk of resulting in reckless
actions. In retrospect, it has been proven that a good
deal of the information shared on the Internet was not
appropriately researched, having been based on desi-
res, emotions, commentary and rumors rather than on
real events. 
For 82%, the primary objective was the greatest
possible diffusion of images of protests happening daily
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in the streets of Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, along with
the publication of data and testimonies of the atrocities
being committed against citizens. In this way, they
were able to destroy the regime’s credibility and inter-
nationally publicize each country’s reality, especially
related to acts of repression. And for 63%, the next
priority was to make sure that their fellow citizens
were kept informed about international support,
impact and opinion about the conflicts, since they
were distrustful of the local press, which had been
conditioned to accept governmental censorship and
propaganda. This group of interviewees felt that the
information provided on the Internet, in spite of inac-
curate reporting on certain events, as detailed earlier,
helped them to configure a more realistic opinion
about the conflicts, and above all to lift the spirits of the
those who were directly involved in the protests to
ensure that they felt morally supported.
Some 78% confirm that the intrinsic possibilities of
new technologies were influential in increasing the
visibility of the Arab uprisings. In fact, 59% claim that
they had very little prior knowledge of information
management in virtual scenarios, and just by having
used the Internet to participate in the conflicts of their
home country they have a better understanding of
information and communication technologies. For
23%, the experience of the uprisings has made them
reflect on the potential and risks of the Internet and
social networks. 
Despite recognizing the benefits of some of the
actions undertaken, 89% acknowledged the lack of a
unifying strategy, just as they did earlier in the report,
and felt that a large part of the potential of the Internet
had been squandered due to the fact that many of the
transmitted messages were simply testimonies of soli-
darity with and support for the young Arab comba-
tants, and rarely contained any useful information.
The self-criticisms of the participants regarding their
virtual participation in the process increased greatly
from the beginning stages of the conflict to the end. In
the first wave of interviews, 79% believed that they
were acting correctly, but the level of satisfaction fell
to 34% in the last interview, when a complete regime
change had already occurred in each of the three
countries. The most critical subjects found the actions
at the beginning of the conflict to be appropriate, but
when analyzed later, the efficiency of these achieve-
ments was put into perspective.
The information collected during the interviews
reflects both qualitative and quantitative changes in the
use of the Internet and social networks while the upri-
sings were taking place, and 90% of the interview sub-
jects recognize that the intensity, frequency and con-
tent-sharing capabilities of communications during the
conflict evolved a great deal from beginning to end.
Initially, communication occurred within a small group
of friends and acquaintances, but this group continued
to expand as the conflict progressed. Moreover, the
exceptional circumstances conditioned the kinds of
messages that were received. In early communica-
tions, people were more interested in anecdotes, but
later, the level of involvement deepened. As the con-
flicts evolved and worsened, so too did the concern
felt for family members and friends. 
On being asked about the motives behind their deci-
sion to actively participate in the uprisings in their coun-
tries of origin from abroad via the Internet, 86% of the
interviewed youths say that they have seen them selves
caught up in a new and unexpected phenomenon and
that they initially participated, as previously mentioned,
out of solidarity, then found themselves collaborating for
a variety of causes. Most coincide in highlighting two:
61% felt a moral obligation to do something for their
country, and 74% joined the virtual process not only to
show solidarity but also because of ideological convic-
tions, as this presented a unique opportunity to influence
a political change which would improve conditions in
their country and assure freedom and democracy in the
future. Only 10% were convinced by friends, and the
rest participated for other reasons.
Apart from the exchanges of information with
friends and acquaintances, 83% maintained constant
contact with a family member through social networks,
almost always with young people as older members
rarely use such technology, but the frequency and the
content of the messages were very different in each
case. During the period analyzed, 87% of the commu-
nication between friends was centred on political
questions or matters related to the development of the
protests, whilst 95% of messages sent to the family
worried about their well-being.
Although the basis of the communication between
Arab residents in Barcelona, Madrid and Santiago de
Compostela and their countrymen from Tunisia,
Egypt and Libya was the Internet and social networks,
71% also used digital versions of the popular press-
both from Spain and abroad- as a source of informa-
tion (30% on a daily basis, 19% once or twice a week,
and 22% very occasionally) above all to gauge the
international reaction to the conflicts. 65% trusted the
reliability of this popular press because they conside-
red it to be a guarantee of objectivity and neutrality,
since it came from countries not directly involved in
the conflicts (Gómez-Diago, 2005). 
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This information helped them to verify and corro-
borate the magnitude of the confrontations, and provi-
ded them with details to allow them to evaluate the
strengths, weaknesses and strategies of the regime with
criteria which was, in their opinion, fairly objective,
thus enabling them to calculate the rebels’ capacity for
resistance. Then they would transmit their impressions
via social networks. Consequently, news stories from
Spanish and foreign press
would often become a trigger
which influenced the volume
and intensity of the messages,
both when levels of concern
became heightened and when
people sensed the expectation
of triumph.
Comparing the results of
the interviews with informa-
tion about the Arab uprisings
which appeared on «TVE»,
«El País» and «El Mundo»in
the same period, one observes
that news reports about the
most intense incidents that
took place during the protests
coincide with the dates the
interviewees associate with
peaks in the traffic of online
information, a parallel which is
also visible in the content of
the messages. The inter -
viewees admit that the popular
press was for them a source of
information and a habitual
reference point, and that often
they would rely on such
reports to keep their country-
men updated and informed
about the international reac-
tion to the development of the conflict, and the exter-
nal support they could count on at each moment. For
73% of the youths, the information about the Arab
uprisings published by the Spanish press gave them a
certain confidence because, according to them, it
boasts adequate infrastructure and human resources to
be able to obtain reliable information, a privilege not
available to all countries. Despite this, for 55%, not all
media outlets show the same sensitivity with regard to
problems facing Arab countries, something which
could affect their focus, their attitude about the con-
flicts and the processing of information.
Of the youths interviewed, 64% are extremely cri-
tical of the development of the revolutionary process in
Tunisia, Egypt and Libya as they believe that it has not
been well organized, and for 52% the achievements of
the revolutions are neither solid nor sufficient enough
to guarantee a stable democracy and full freedom in
the future. In spite of the apparent triumphs, 43% do
not expect great progress, because for them a regime
change does not necessarily imply profound social
change. Only 26% declared themselves satisfied with
the current situation.
4. Conclusions
The political and social changes which have occu-
rred in the Arab world in the last two years cannot be
attributed to one singular event. They are the result of
various factors: an inevitable social evolution, sped up
thanks to regular contact with the outside world, a
generalized discontent due to their precarious econo-
mic condition, in large part brought about by govern-
ment corruption, and the desire to improve their living
conditions and obtain a larger share of freedoms. In
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The political and social changes which have occurred in the
Arab world in the last two years cannot be attributed to one
singular event. They are the result of various factors: an 
inevitable social evolution, sped up thanks to regular contact
with the outside world, a generalized discontent due to their
precarious economic condition, in large part brought about
by government corruption, and the desire to improve their
living conditions and obtain a larger share of freedoms. In
such a context, technology has come to play a determining
role. Thus it is essential that one takes into account the 
communicative possibilities which the Internet and social
networks offer in order to analyze and understand the 
planning and development of the process which led to the
uprisings and the subsequent fall of the regimes in 
Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya.
such a context, technology has come to play a deter-
mining role. Thus it is essential that one takes into
account the communicative possibilities which the
Internet and social networks offer in order to analyze
and understand the planning and development of the
process which led to the uprisings and the subsequent
fall of the regimes in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya.
There remains the impression that the virtual sup-
port for the Arab uprisings was based on coordinated
actions, but an analysis of the reality, as has been
demonstrated in the data from this investigation, shows
that this was not the case; there was simply a con-
fluence of similar activity which, by chance, coincided
in time and platform. However, there was also an
important mimetic effect, emerging from the first inter-
national declarations of solidarity, which transformed
into a massive phenomenon as a consequence of the
summoning power of the Internet and its word-of-
mouth effect. This caused the support base to grow
progressively from the very beginning.
In the development of the conflicts the factors of
commitment and solidarity have played an extremely
important role, and these values have had a decisive
influence in the participation of the youth in activities
supporting the uprisings which have been carried out
online. 
Arab citizens, both those residing in their country
and those living abroad, for the first time were able to
take advantage of a possibility which, until then, had
been rarely used in such a direct, popular way: indivi-
dual actions focused towards group communication,
personal suggestions and ideas working for a common
goal. This communicative flow derived from com bined
but uncoordinated action which could be defined as
communication of the masses based on the virtual rela-
tionships which are possible thanks to the Internet.
This demonstrates that technology can act as a tool of
action associated with the phenomenon of a localized
protest, allowing it to acquire a global dimension.
The popular press is a source of information for
users of the Internet. However, as well as having all
the functions which correspond with classic methods
of communication, the Internet and social networks
offer alternative services which are out of the reach of
the printed press, the radio and the television, and
which, in under-developed societies, as in the case of
the Arab world, where the uprisings took place, play a
key role: keeping the citizens informed and well-com-
municated at all times, both domestically and abroad,
at extremely low cost and with almost instant feed-
back. Thanks to these possibilities an unprecedented
communicative phenomenon was developed which
facilitated the communication and the virtual relation -
ship between people with very different profiles, a
plural communicative exchange, but with a common
objective: the concern for the development of the
social and political conflicts taking place in various
Arab countries.
These services are responsible for part of the suc-
cess (or the importance) of the Internet in the Arab
uprisings because, although there was no professional
coordination between the activists, the fact that it
makes contact between citizens possible means it
improves conditions to organize combined actions,
something essential in the planning and development
of protests. These opportunities are one of the new
features of the uprisings because both the Internet and
social networks are, from a historical point of view,
and compared with the trajectory of classic methods of
communication, extremely recent. Until the time in
question there had never been the opportunity to
demonstrate their potential in such a peculiar and
complex situation, thus understanding their communi-
cative possibilities and capacity to influence.
The role of the Internet, its efficiency and the
intensity of the communications, has differed at various
points in the conflicts. The Internet and social net-
works were useful to overcome the isolation of Arab
society, making the revolutions visible and forging rele-
vant support abroad. However, the interviewed youth
recognize that the advantages were greater at the
beginning because, over time, difficulties began to
appear which could not be solved through technology,
and they soon realised the illusion that they were
under. Furthermore, they discovered the limitations of
the Internet when faced with the infrastructure of pro-
paganda that the regime had set up throughout the
country. Fighting against such powerful resources was
a complicated matter. 
The Internet also serves a testimonial and legali-
zing function. The messages sent remain registered,
and are a detailed accounting of the development of
the events and the emotional states of those involved,
since outpourings of euphoria varied depending on the
triumphs and failures in the different phases of the
uprisings.
The interviewed youth recognize that the conflicts
have brought about significant change and relevant
and necessary progress, yet the majority are skeptical
about the permanence of the victories and believe
that, in the short term, there will not be an all-encom-
passing evolution involving all facets of society which
allows the development of a modern, free society.
They consider that many of the achievements are not
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sufficiently consolidated and deep-rooted to be consi-
dered irreversible and definitive, and think that in some
aspects there is the risk of regression. Furthermore,
they distinguish between those changes which are
important and those that are influential. Thus, when
asking them to specify in which aspects or sectors they
notice most important advances and in which there
has been least evolution, or less democratization, they
maintain that, apparently, there is more individual free -
dom but, on the other hand, neither state structures
nor the most repressive laws affecting the essence of
democracy have been modified, meaning many of the
achievements have had little or no effect. They also
maintain that the political reforms must be accompa-
nied by economic reform to ensure that they are viable
and sustainable. 
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